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Life is filled with the unexpected. Researchers disappointed with a
promising pharmaceutical for hypertension and angina began to notice that
users were consistently reporting a surprising side effect. Further
investigation lead to Viagra. 1 Children enjoying the wonders of Play-Doh
can thank what was initially an attempt to create wallpaper cleaner. 2 Those
of us who could not function in the world without our assortment of Post-It
notes owe it all to a group of scientists who were trying to make an
effective adhesive.' The point is that some of the most important results of
our labors can be unintended. Like science, law, too, seems to possess the
capacity for serendipity.
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Old
Chief v. United States,4 the Court examined Federal Rule of Evidence 4031
in light of a defense offer to stipulate to aspects of the proffered
prosecution evidence, purportedly to lessen their prejudicial impact.
6
While this was clearly an issue of interest to litigators and trial judges, the
decision hardly portended anything earth-shattering. Where the rhetoric
of that decision may lead, however, could well eclipse Post-It notes in
significance (at least within the criminal court system). For at the core of
the opinion rests the validation of a theory born from such disparate fields
as Law and Literature,' Sociology,8 and Narrative Theory.9
1. Giles Whittell, Wackiest Paths to Prosperity, THE AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 27,
2002, at 32. See generally SHARON BERTSCH MCGRAYNE, BLUE GENES AND
POLYESTER PLANTS 17-79, 131-46 (1997) (recounting serendipitous discoveries in
chemistry, zoology, medicine, and such).
2. Whittell, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). For a detailed analysis of
the case, see Jeff Nicodemus et al., Recent Developments, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 441, 444-
46 (1997). For a practical perspective, review the "seven lessons" discussion in Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Trial Tactics, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1997, at 45, 48.
5. The rule states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
6. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. at 185-86.
7. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 169 (1995) ("The story is the most basic way we
have of organizing our experience and claiming meaning for it.").
8. See, e.g., LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 32-37 (1981) (discussing the social functions of
American trial justice).
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While this recognition of narrative theory could have sweeping
implications for how appellate courts assess trial errors, my objectives in
this Article are far more modest than to explore the full spectrum of such
possibilities. Rather, I will focus on only one such possible application of
narrative theory. Specifically, it will be my contention that, though it was
not on the proverbial radar screen of the Court when it decided Old Chief,
narrative theory provides the most effective tool available for assessing
prejudice from Brady error (i.e., where the prosecutor fails to provide the
defense with "exculpatory" evidence). 10 It is that proposition that this
Article addresses.
In Part II, I will briefly discuss the Old Chief case and the various
perspectives of commentators following the decision. Part III will then set
up the context for the Court's incorporation of narrative theory in Old
Chief. In Part IV, I will discuss the specific way in which the United States
Supreme Court, for the first time, validated and applied narrative theory in
a decision.
In Parts V and VI, I will then move to the heart of my proposal for
reform, first exploring the limitations of the current doctrine for evaluating
the prejudicial impact of a so-called Brady error, and then proposing
incorporation of narrative theory into the current analysis as a way of
meeting these limitations. Finally, I apply my proposal in Part VII to a
case example: a street criminal facing life without the possibility of parole
after conviction for his "third strike."
9. See generally John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered
Representation: What Is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories
Collide?, 6 CLINIcAL L. REv. 85, 85-97 (1999) (arguing that all legal theories are
derived from cultural and historical narratives).
10. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84-85, 87 (1963) (holding that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"). While this Article
focuses on the use of narrative theory as a tool for assessing a Brady error, narrative
theory would be similarly useful for assessing the impact of any error resulting from the
denial of defense evidence to the fact finder. Thus, narrative theory could be useful in
determining whether the erroneous denial of proffered defense evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence affected a substantial right. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)
("Error may not be predicted upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected .... ); see also Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211,
218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing "substantial rights" standard for finding reversible
error and concluding that such a right has been affected when "the error affect[s] the
outcome of the case").
2005]
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II. OLD CHIEF LEVEL ONE: A CASE ABOUT EVIDENCE THEORY
As the result of an altercation at a liquor store, Johnny Lynn Old
Chief faced two federal charges: assault with a dangerous weapon with
intent to do bodily harm and felon in possession of a firearm.11 The
problem for the defense was that the prior felony supporting the felon in
possession of a firearm charge was an "assault causing serious bodily
injury."'12 If the jury heard about this prior violent assault, the defense
understandably feared the jury would think Old Chief was a violent sort
who likely acted accordingly during the incident at the liquor store.
13
As all law students learn in Evidence class, the American legal system
refuses to let a jury hear evidence revealing a defendant's prior bad acts if
the sole purpose of the evidence is to ask the jury to infer that the
defendant is the kind of person (i.e., had a "propensity") to do such bad
things and, therefore, probably acted "in conformity" with that deficient
character in the current case. 4 On the other hand, evidence law will allow
prior bad acts to be brought before the jury if the evidence is relevant for
something (i.e., has an "other purpose") other than to ask the jury to
engage in forbidden propensity logic. 15 Because a prior felony conviction
was a necessary element of one of the crimes with which Old Chief was
charged, it was obviously admissible for this "other purpose" and thus the
introduction of the prior conviction did not run afoul of the bar on
11. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. at 174-75; see also Brief for the
United States at 2-3, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (No. 95-6556)
(summarizing charges and noting that the fracas took place at a liquor store).
12. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. at 175. "[E]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character as a basis for suggesting the
inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it." FED. R.
EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note; see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.
at 181-82 (discussing Rule 404(b)); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76
(1948) (discussing the common law tradition of prohibiting the use of character
evidence by the prosecution as part of the case-in-chief).
13. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. at 175.
14. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The rule provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident....
Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
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propensity evidence.16
Defense counsel understood this rule and accepted that the jury
would be told that his client had a prior felony which was among the list of
those that made subsequent possession of a gun illegal.17 However, defense
counsel did not want the jury to hear this prior felony was for assault
resulting in serious bodily injury.18 This information carried the risk that,
despite a limiting instruction, 19 the jury would tend to find the defendant
guilty of the liquor store shooting because he was "the kind of person" who
assaulted people.
With this in mind, defense counsel offered to stipulate that the jury be
told Old Chief had a prior felony conviction in order to satisfy the element
of the felon in possession of a firearm charge, but that the jury not be told
the felony conviction was for a serious assault. 20 Thus, the prosecutor
would satisfy the prior felony element of the offense, and the defendant
would be spared the risk that the jury would engage in propensity logic.
Everybody's happy, right? Not quite. The prosecutor refused to agree to
the stipulation, claiming that the Government had the right to try its case as
16. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 175-76.
18. Id. at 175. However, some point out that it is not always in a defendant's
interest to allow a jury to speculate as to the particular crime for which the defendant
was previously convicted. See, e.g., Michael J. Pavloski, Old Chief v. United States:
Interpretation and Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 33 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 797, 832-35 (1999) ("The rule does not prevent juries from considering the nature
of the prior felony, rather, it only deprives them of accurate information concerning it,"
leaving jurors to speculate as to the nature of the stipulated prior felony, including
speculation based on negative stereotyping); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United
States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Responsibility?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 950-52
(1997) (suggesting that jurors may be left to rely falsely on the circumstances of the
crime or on stereotypes).
19. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a party may ask for a limiting
instruction, and "the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope
and instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. Ev1D. 105. Thus, defense counsel in Old
Chief could have asked for an instruction informing the jury that it could only consider
the prior assault conviction as a predicate for the felon with a firearm charge. In fact,
one criticism of Old Chief is that it appears to preclude a trial court from considering
an option such as Rule 105. See Lynn Amanda Wyers, Note, Judicial Discretion and a
Prosecutor's Right to Prove the Case: An Analysis of Old Chief v. United States, 42 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 917, 943 (1998) ("For example, the district court may determine that the
record of prior conviction is unfairly prejudicial, but that this prejudice may be
adequately alleviated through a proper curative instruction ...




The issue before the Supreme Court was an interesting one: Can a
defense offer to stipulate-in lieu of arguably prejudicial prosecution
evidence, where the stipulation thereby provides a less prejudicial way to
prove an element of a crime-affect the outcome of a Rule 403 balancing
by diminishing the probative value of the otherwise proffered prejudicial
evidence?22 The majority said yes, 23 and Old Chief's conviction was
reversed.
24
Predictably, disparate commentary in legal journals followed. Some
criticized the Supreme Court for throwing away an opportunity to clarify
the Rule 403 balancing25 and, in actuality, making matters more muddled.
2 6
Others have voiced concern that the Court had breached the basic tenet
that, within the rules of ethics, evidence, and procedure, the prosecution is
left to try its case as it sees fit,27 and does not have to accept a defense
stipulation in lieu of how it would choose to prove its case.
28
21. Id. at 177.
22. Id. at 174.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 192.
25. E.g., Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403 After United States v. Old Chief,
20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 563, 590 (1997) ("Rule 403 after Old Chief may well closely
resemble Rule 403 before Old Chief. If so, a tremendous opportunity to develop a
practical standard for guiding discretion will have been wasted.").
26. See Pavloski, supra note 18, at 819-23. In fact, some contend that the
Court added new issues by failing to give guidance to the symmetry versus asymmetry
issue (i.e., if a prior felony would appear minor to jurors, can a prosecutor force a
stipulation preventing the jurors from hearing the exact nature of the prior felony, even
though the defense wants them to know?). Id. at 821; see also Donnie L. Kidd, Jr.,
Case Note, Pretending to Upset the Balance: Old Chief v. United States and Exclusion
of Prior Felony Conviction Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 231, 272 (1998) ("If the rule applies symmetrically, then neither the defense
nor the prosecution may introduce the nature of a prior conviction.... If the rule is
asymmetrical, then the defendant could introduce prior conviction evidence to assist
the defense, but the prosecution would remain barred from introducing the nature of
the past felony."); Richman, supra note 18, at 954 (arguing that the analysis employed
by the Old Chief Court could disadvantage defendants if they are prevented from
offering evidence about the nature of prior felonies if they wish); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Trial Tactics, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1997, at 45, 48 (identifying situations in which "the
approach taken by the majority in Old Chief will not always favor the defendant").
27. Wyers, supra note 19, at 940-41.
28. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. at 186-87 (recognizing the "standard
rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or,
more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the
full evidentiary force of the case the Government chooses to present").
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From a defense perspective, some saw in Old Chief the possibility of
significant tactical advantage, 29 suggesting the use of "judicial admissions"3 0
or "judicial notice"31 as preferable to offers of stipulation to accomplish
that task. Most, however, saw Old Chief as a very limited ruling,32
procedurally difficult to raise,3  unlikely to lead to reversal,4 and applying
29. E.g., Scott Patterson, Case Note, Old Chief v. United States: Radical
Change or Minor Departure? How Much Further Will Courts Go in Limiting the
Prosecution's Ability to Try Its Case?, 49 MERCER L. REv. 855, 864 (1998) ("[D]efense
attorneys have a tremendous window of opportunity to push for an expansive reading
of Old Chief and to offer to stipulate to any prejudicial or detrimental elements of the
crime in order to preclude the jury from being influenced by the introduction of
evidence of those crimes."); David Rudolph & Gordon Widenhouse, Reeling in
Otherwise Relevant Evidence Due to Unfair Prejudice, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at
46, 56 (identifying the Old Chief decision as giving rise to two new weapons for
criminal defense attorneys: to challenge "a trial court's discretionary rule on a Rule
403 objection," and "to challenge prejudicial evidence for which a less damaging
alternative exists").
30. See D. Michael Risinger, Johnny Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old
Chief, and "Legitimate Moral Force"-Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings
and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 451 (1998) (explaining that "if one is ever going to
recognize that it is sometimes serious error to reject a proffered judicial admission,"
Old Chief was such a case, because the defendant stipulated to the "status element" of
the offense, rendering "unnecessary" the specifics of the predicate felony).
31. See James Joseph Duane, Stipulations, Judicial Notice, and a Prosecutor's
Supposed "Right" to Prove Undisputed Facts: Oral Argument from an Amicus Curiae
in Old Chief v. United States, 168 F.R.D. 405, 419 (1996) (explaining that judicial
notice allows one party to go over the other party's head by obtaining an admission
from a judge under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 that a fact is true).
32. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 25, at 590 (stating that "Rule 403 after Old
Chief may well closely resemble Rule 403 before Old Chief'); Kidd, supra note 26, at
268-69 (stating that the holding of Old Chief is limited); David Robinson, Jr., Old
Chief, Crowder, and Trials by Stipulation, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 311, 342 (1998)
(stating that Old Chief's holding was narrow).
33. See James Joseph Duane, Litigating Felon-with-a-Firearm Cases After Old
Chief, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1997, at 18, 21 (arguing that "[elven if you find that some
district judge has arguably violated [a defendant's] rights under Old Chief at some
future trial, any appeal seeking to obtain reversal solely on that ground will almost
always be dead on arrival" because error must be "properly preserved by just the right
maneuvering in the district court"-"[t]he defense must have remembered to offer an
appropriate stipulation," and the stipulation offered cannot be "conditional, equivocal,
or unclear").
34. Id. at 21-22; see also Terry W. McCarthy, Comment, The Use of Unilateral
Stipulation as a Trial Tactic in Alabama After Old Chief: The Effect of the Federal
Rules of Evidence on an Infancy State, 50 ALA. L. REv. 237, 251 (1998) (noting "the
early returns indicate [Old Chiefs] rather limited holding," recognizing that
"[d]ecisions subsequent to Old Chief have held that even if the trial judge erred in not
2005]
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to a narrow set of facts and charges where, as in Old Chief, an element of
the charge is a status (i.e., prior felon).
35
But there, lying within the rhetoric of the opinion, all but unnoticed
by most of the commentary, 36 were the seeds of a dramatic refraining of
how appellate courts understand jury trials. For in Old Chief, the Supreme
Court of the United States for the very first time validated and applied
narrative theory37 (a.k.a. "Narratology") 38 and, in doing so, set in motion
accepting [a] stipulation, the conviction will not be overturned if it is harmless error");
Jana L. Torok, Comment, The Undoing of Old Chief: Harmless Error and Felon-in-
Possession-of-Firearms Cases, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 431, 431 (1999) (noting that several
courts of appeals have found that district courts' admitting evidence of the name and
nature of prior felonies, thus violating Old Chief, was harmless error).
35. See McCarthy, supra note 34, at 251 (stating that if properly used, felony
convictions can only be used to prove felony status, not action in conformity
therewith); see also Kathryn Cameron Walton, Note, An Exercise in Sound Discretion:
Old Chief v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1053, 1092 (1998) (noting the Court in Old
Chief "has formulated a new rule that applies in a narrow context of cases requiring
proof of a defendant's status as a felon" and "has used the discretion that Rule 403
affords the judiciary generally to provide a specific rule that negates a trial court's
discretion in determining the admissibility of prior convictions under the felon-in-
possession statute").
36. There were a few exceptions. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Policing Stories, in
LAW'S MADNESS 29 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2003). Brooks writes:
It is almost as if [Justice] Souter had been reading literary "narratology"
(which he may have been, since he appears to be the most erudite and curious
of the current justices) and been persuaded by the argument that narrative is a
different kind of organization and presentation of experience, a different kind
of "language" for speaking the world ....
Souter in Old Chief does articulate the nature and force of
narrative in the law, in a startling move that [the author] ha[d] not found in
other legal opinions.
Id. at 31, 33; see also Kidd, supra note 26, at 231-32 (recognizing the role of stories in
trials); Risinger, supra note 30, at 455 (noting the Supreme Court's recognition of
narrative theory).
37. Brooks, supra note 36, at 33; see also Risinger, supra note 30, at 455
(describing the use of narrative theory).
38. Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 737 (1997)
(reviewing LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996)) ("The law and literature movement has evolved to a point at
which it comprises a number of subdisciplines. One of the newer ones-call it 'legal
narratology' - is concerned with the story elements in law and legal scholarship.").
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what is likely to be the true legacy of the case.
III. OLD CHIEF LEVEL TWO: THE CONTEXT FOR INCORPORATION OF
NARRATIVE THEORY
In Old Chief, the majority was willing to push against a
semisacrosanct line in criminal trials.39 The general rule has been that the
defense cannot force the prosecution to accept a stipulation in place of the
prosecution's desired means of proving some point in its case.4° The
prosecution bears the burden of proof, and a very heavy one at that. It
should be free to try its case as it wants, and should not have its
presentation to the jury constricted by forced acceptance of defense offers
to stipulate.4 1 As a general rule, this sentiment is persuasive.
For example, imagine that a defendant is charged with armed robbery
of a store under an aiding and abetting theory for being the getaway driver.
The defense strategy is to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the
defendant knew what was happening inside the store, thereby showing that
the defendant lacked the element of intent to aid and abet in the robbery.
Imagine further, that if left to her own devices, the prosecutor would elicit
the following dialogue from an eyewitness to the incident, Mr. Jones:
Prosecutor [P]: Mr. Jones, do you recall where you were
around 3:45 p.m., October 17th of this year?
Witness [W]: I was just walking out of Joline's Cards. I had
to get a birthday card for my nephew.
[P]: Did you notice anything unusual at that time?
[W]: Well, something did catch my eye.
[P]: And what was that?
39. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1997) (recognizing
the "standard rule" that the prosecution may "prove its case by evidence of its own
choice").
40. Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958); see id. ("The reason
for the rule is to permit a party 'to present to the jury a picture of the events relied
upon [and that] [t]o substitute for such a picture a naked admission might have the
effect to rob the evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight."') (quoting
Dunning v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 A. 352, 356 (Me. 1897)).
41. See Wyers, supra note 19, at 940-41 (arguing that "[t]he role of the
prosecution is, in essence, to develop and present a 'continuous story' to the jury"
which "is undermined when a prosecutor is forced to stipulate to elements of the crime
for which the defendant has been charged").
2005]
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[W]: There was this car parked in front of the Dollar Store.
[P]: Was that unusual?
[W]: Not that he was parked, but that he'd parked in the
commercial loading-unloading zone when there were half a
dozen empty legal spaces right next to where he was parked.
[P]: Is there any difference between the commercial space
and the other spaces?
[W]: Well, the commercial space is parallel to the curb and
right on the corner. The legal spaces are those back-in,
parallel parking kind.
[P]: Anything else?
[W]: Yes. The car was running and the driver kept looking
around. I mean, he and I made eye contact, and it was weird.
[P]: How?
[WI: He looked a bit, like, like startled I was looking at him.
And then he quickly looked away.
Imagine now that before Mr. Jones can take the stand, defense
counsel asks to approach the bench and says:
Your Honor, hearing this witness is a waste of time under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403. We will stipulate that my client was in the driver's seat and
the car was running. While we do not contend that the testimony of the
witness is unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 as was the case in Old Chief,
this testimony nevertheless is properly precluded under Rule 403's grounds
of wasting time and confusing the jury, given its peripheral nature in light of
my client's willingness to stipulate to the gist of that testimony.
I do not think any of us would believe the prosecutor should have to
accept that stipulation. On the other hand, many reasonable minds
(including a majority of the Supreme Court) would conclude that
mandating the prosecution to accept the stipulation in Old Chief was
totally proper. How can we account for this? Enter narrative theory as an
analytic tool.
IV. OLD CHIEF LEVEL THREE: THE EMERGENCE OF NARRATIVE
THEORY
Crucial to the Old Chief Court's eventual decision that Rule 403
barred admitting evidence about the defendant's prior conviction for a
[Vol. 53
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serious assault in light of the defense stipulation offer was the following
passage:
The "fair and legitimate weight" of conventional evidence showing
individual thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact that
making a case with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the
formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with
descriptive richness. Unlike an abstract premise, whose force depends
on going precisely to a particular step in a course of reasoning, a piece
of evidence may address any number of separate elements, striking
hard just because it shows so much at once; the account of a shooting
that establishes capacity and causation may tell just as much about the
triggerman's motive and intent. Evidence thus has force beyond any
linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative
gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to
sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they
may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict. . . . Thus, the
prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as
much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to
convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable
as much as to point to the discrete elements of a defendant's legal
fault.
In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to
prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the
evidence away rests on good sense. A syllogism is not a story, and a
naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust
evidence that would be used to prove it. People who hear a story
interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing
chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story's
truth can feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing
that more could be said than they have heard. A convincing tale can
be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the
natural sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing
link is really there is never more than second best.
42
The concept that lawyers are persuasively communicating with jurors
when they are telling "a colorful story with descriptive richness" 43 (i.e., a




narrative), provides a perspective against which the question of the
propriety of the respective proffered stipulations in Old Chief and our
hypothetical getaway driver case are easily resolved. In Old Chief, the
exact nature of the particular prior felony (as opposed to the very fact that
the defendant had a felony conviction constituting an element of felon in
possession of a gun) is not any part of the "story" of what happened that
day at the liquor store.4 With or without this information about a prior
serious assault, the prosecution witnesses will testify to exactly the same
information about the alleged assault with a deadly weapon at the liquor
store. In fact, the only "story" to be drawn from information that the prior
felony was for a serious assault is one based on forbidden propensity
logic. 45
In contrast, the stipulation in our hypothetical would clearly be
improper within a narrative theory frame. After all, the stipulation would
take away the detail and nuance which, in combination, provides the jury
with a classic story of a getaway driver.
The Old Chief Court's use of narrative theory as a framework to
understand an aspect of the legal system (here, a jury trial) is unique only
in the fact that this is the first time the Supreme Court has ever formally
acknowledged and utilized the theory in one of its cases. It is hardly novel,
44. See id. at 190-91 (noting that the prosecution's need to tell a continuous
story has no application when the point at issue is the defendant's status, which is
dependent on another judgment rendered on events independent of the later criminal
charges against him).
45. See FED. R. Ev1D. 404(b). Peter Brooks adds that:
Souter here breaches the bar over what you might call an element of the
repressed unconscious of the law, bringing to light a narrative content and
form that traditionally go unrecognized. Yet curiously, or perhaps predictably,
he does it by way of arguing that in the present case the lower courts failed to
guard against the irrelevant and illegitimate power of narrative, admitting into
evidence story elements-the story of Old Chief's prior crime-that should not
be considered part of the "natural sequence" of the present crime. The past
story would give too much credence to the present story that the prosecution
must prove. It is in defending against the power of storytelling that Souter
admits its force.
This defensiveness is typical of the law: its recognition of the claim of
narrative in the law most often comes-though rarely in such open and
perspicuous form as Souter gives it here-by way of its desire to limit the play
of narrative, its desire to set narrow formal limits to storytelling.
Brooks, supra note 36, at 32.
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however, in legal46 and scientific literature.47 In fact, the notion that
theories about storytelling and the human experience could be
productively applied to law in general, and jury decision making in
particular, pre-dated Old Chief by well over a decade.
46. See generally PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 8-34 (2000)
(discussing the importance of storytelling through confessions); LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996)
(collecting essays discussing legal discourse as a mixture of narrative and rhetoric);
DAVID RAY PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE (1991) (collecting essays
discussing the importance of narrative in legal education, courtroom strategies, and
legal commentary, and proposing alternative legal narratives); ROBIN WEST,
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 345-418 (1993) (comparing and contrasting
Northrup Frye's analysis of the role of myth in narrative literature with analogous
judicial traditions, concluding that parallels can be drawn between the two concepts
because they both rely on common narrative methods).
47. See generally, e.g., BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 8 (employing
narrative theory to better explain jurors' decisionmaking process). Bennett and
Feldman's sociological research on stories as affecting the core of jury decisionmaking
parallels the findings of cognitive psychologists who believe we give meaning to our
experience by placing it into cognitive frames or "schema." Schema can be thought of
as follows:
All of us carry socially-constructed conceptions of the world composed of an
array of cognitive structures that guide the constant process of interpretation
that we call giving meaning to our experience. The influences that create these
structures are both a function of our concrete experiences and our cultural
knowledge base. Both of those components of course will likely differ with
class, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.
John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1310-11
(1994) (footnote omitted). See Richard C. Anderson, The Notion of Schemata and the
Educational Enterprise: General Discussion of the Conference, in SCHOOLING AND THE
ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE 415, 415-30 (Richard C. Anderson et al. eds., 1977)
(discussing the importance of "response components, perceptual factors, semantic
features, functional attributes," and other similar elements used in educational settings
by students to perceive and comprehend); Robert Glaser, Education and Thinking:
The Role of Knowledge, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 93, 100 (1984) (defining schema as "a
modifiable information structure that represents generic concepts stored in memory;"
asserting that "[p]eople typically try to integrate new information with prior
knowledge," thus allowing individuals to "fill in" gaps in a narrative with information
from their own schema); John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice
Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 275, 277-87 (1989) (applying schema theory in an educational setting); David E.
Rumelhart, Schemata: The Building of Blocks of Cognition, in THEORETICAL ISSUES IN
READING COMPREHENSION 33-58 (Rand J. Spiro et al. eds., 1980) (same). See
generally JEAN PIAGET, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1932)
(presenting cognitive, as opposed to behavioral, theory regarding child development).
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In one of the most extensive studies of jury decision making in a
criminal case, sociologists Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman found that
narrative provided the key to understanding juror behavior in two
fundamental respects. First, narrative allows jurors to make sense of the
trial. 8 Opening statements aside, trials are often fragmented affairs in
which evidence comes in a piece at a time, often without any deference to
logical order, and at times consists of extensive evidentiary foundations
which are unrelated to the substance of the case. Jurors make sense of this
by constantly trying to fit the information they are hearing into a story.
49
Narrative also guides jurors to their ultimate decision, as they look at the
stories being presented and assess whether they "made sense" in terms of
logic, common sense, their own experiences, their cultural biases and
beliefs, and their own stories about how people do or do not behave in the
situations raised in the trial.5 0 A study by Nancy Penning and Reid Hastie
confirms Bennett and Feldman's thesis.5 Penning and Hastie argue that
jurors do not make their decisions using mathematical models, Bayesian or
otherwise.52 They decide using what Penning and Hastie call the "Story
Model. 53 Like Bennett and Feldman, these researchers conclude that
jurors order the information at trial into story representations and then
compare their own stories to those offered by the parties in deciding the
case's outcome. 4  Their central finding is that "the story the juror
constructs determines the juror's decision. '55 These stories are constructed
from case-specific information mixed with the juror's unique knowledge
48. See BENNErr & FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 164-68 (describing how jurors
rely on the story presented to them in order to organize and make sense of all aspects
of the case).
49. Id. at 9-10.
50. See id. at 88-90 (discussing how the structural properties of a narrative
become important to jurors in making their decision, and concluding "that the way in
which a story is told will have considerable bearing on its perceived credibility
regardless of the actual truth status of the story").
51. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDoZO L. REv. 519, 521-22 (1991) (arguing
that "jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information" derived from
"case-specific information acquired during the trial," "knowledge about events similar
in content to those that are the topic of the dispute," and "generic expectations about
what makes a complete story").
52. Id. at 519-20.
53. Id. at 520.
54. Id. at 521-22.
55. Id. at 521; see also id. at 525 (arguing that jurors construct different stories
that will determine the decision that a particular juror reaches).
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and beliefs about the world and those in it.56 In other words, the story will
reflect the juror's socially constructed reality.
7
Thus, in providing doctrinal legitimation for narrative theory, the
Supreme Court has aligned its understanding of how jury trials really work
with that of social scientists, cognitive psychologists, and law and literature
academics.58 Down which paths, however, does this legitimation of
narrative theory lead?
The remainder of this Article will discuss one such path: The
proposition that narrative theory should be utilized by appellate courts as
an analytic tool to assess prejudice resulting from the failure of the
prosecution to provide exculpatory information to the defense (the so-
called Brady error) by evaluating the withheld evidence in terms of its
likely real world impact on the narratives and stories available to the
defense at trial. First, however, it is necessary to analyze the limitations of
the current doctrinal standard for finding reversible error under Brady that
motivate this proposal for reform.
56. Id. at 525.
57. See id. ("Because all jurors hear the same evidence and have the same
general knowledge about the expected structures of stories, differences in story
construction must arise from differences in world knowledge; that is, differences in
experiences and beliefs about the social world.") (emphasis added).
58. Another commentator explains narrative theory as follows:
To the extent that it knows its own narrativity, I have suggested, the law
represses and censors that knowledge. While it is true that courtroom
advocates know they must tell an effective story-and textbooks on trial
practice for law students make the point-one searches legal doctrine in vain
for recognition of narrative as a category of thought and practice. In
discussions of legal decision making, in arguments on rules of evidence, on
causes and effects, there is no overt recognition-Souter's statement on the
subject is a rare exception-that how stories are told may be a major shaping
force in selecting facts and reaching those shining truths. Absent this
recognition, legal actors who are in fact often adjudicating on the basis of
narrative constructions have no conceptual and analytic tools for
understanding and unpacking these constructions.
Brooks, supra note 36, at 40 (footnote omitted).
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V. LEAVING OLD CHIEF BEHIND: APPLYING NARRATIVE THEORY TO
ANALYZE BRADY ERROR
A. Evolution of the Standard for Finding Reversible Brady Error
The ancestry of Brady v. Maryland59 includes a line of Supreme Court
cases beginning with the finding of a due process violation when the
government knowingly presented perjured testimony6° and, later, a finding
of a similar constitutional violation when, though not intentionally
presenting false testimony, the state sat back and allowed false testimony to
go uncorrected when offered by a witness.6
Brady represented a significant jump in this lineage of "fair trial"
cases. The Brady Court found that due process has been violated
"irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution" 62 whenever
the state fails to provide the defendant with favorable evidence prior to
trial "where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. " 63
While this concept appears rather simple and straightforward, the
Supreme Court's analysis of the standard for finding prejudicial error in the
Brady arena has been anything but. In Brady, the Court held that
suppression by the prosecution of material exculpatory evidence regarding
sentencing violated due process.64  The Court, however, offered no
explanation about what it meant by "material" or how this concept of
materiality related to the determination of whether the error was
prejudicial, thus warranting reversal. Of course, the normal standard for
reversal for constitutional error is the Chapman v. California6 test:
"[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. '66 However, while the Chapman test has been applied to cases
where the prosecution knowingly offered or tolerated false testimony, 67 it
has never been applied in a Brady case.
59. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
60. Id. at 86 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
61. Id. at 87 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
62. Id.
63. Id.; accord United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)
(impeachment evidence must be disclosed if the evidence is material); Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (same).
64. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87.
65. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
66. Id. at 24.
67. United States v. Bagley, 473 at 679 n.9.
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United States v. Agurs68 purported to address questions concerning
materiality left undeveloped in Brady.6 9  Initially, the Agurs Court
compressed the standard defining the prosecutor's duty under Brady and
the standard for reversal based on a breach of that duty into a single
concept: materiality." In other words, if a court finds that a piece of
exculpatory evidence is not material, then the prosecutor has no duty to
disclose that information under Brady.7 If, on the other hand, a court finds
that the evidence is material, the prosecutor not only has a duty under
Brady to provide that evidence, but failure to do so will automatically
result in reversal.7
2
So, what is material? To that central issue, the Agurs Court provided
68. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
69. See id. at 107 ("We now consider whether the prosecutor has any
constitutional duty to volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense, and if so, what
standard of materiality gives rise to that duty.").
70. Id. at 108.
71. See id. This analysis, however, has not gone without criticism from
commentators. Professor Tom Stacy assessed the Bagley standard of materiality as
follows:
The Bagley standard, which focuses on the likely impact of evidence on
the ultimate result in the case, suffers from two interrelated deficiencies. The
first problem is that the standard will frequently be misapplied. A prosecutor's
lack of information about the planned defense and partisan inclinations
impede her from making an accurate and objective assessment of the
evidence's effect on the outcome. The second problem is that many
misapplications of the Bagley standard will never be detected and remedied.
Because the prosecution has exclusive possession of the evidence subject to
the duty to disclose and a clear incentive to withhold it, the defense or a court
sometimes will never learn of evidence wrongly withheld.
In short, the Court has interpreted the prosecution's duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence more narrowly than a true concern for accurate fact-
finding implies. For a Court genuinely interested in the search for the truth,
neither the adversarial system, prosecutorial burdens, nor the constitutional
text can justify the Bagley standard, which will result in important exculpatory
evidence not being disclosed in a significant number of cases.
Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1393, 1396 (1991) (footnote omitted).
72. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 112; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 436 (1995) (finding that once withheld exculpatory evidence is found to be




more of a litany of policy concerns than an articulated standard. 73 Because
the prosecution is equally obligated to provide Brady material whether or
not the defense makes a specific request for the information, 74 the Agurs
Court felt it must define Brady (i.e. materially exculpatory) evidence as
that which is "so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the
prosecution notice" of its duty to provide the information. 75 In other
words, the Agurs Court did not want to put the prosecution at risk each
time it failed to provide the defense with some seemingly innocuous scrap
of paper from its file which, in hindsight, could be characterized as
exculpatory. 76  That concern, again, shaped the Court's approach in
developing a standard for materiality.
With that policy framework as a guide, the Agurs Court not only
rejected the application of the classic Chapman test, but even rejected the
less lenient Kotteakos "harmless error" test77 for nonconstitutional error
claims.78 Apparently, the Court felt that an even higher burden was
required for Brady error than under the standard traditionally applied to
nonconstitutional error.79 Otherwise, the Court apparently believed, every
nondisclosure of evidence that could later be characterized as exculpatory
would automatically become constitutional error.80
In trying to ascertain the exact standard the Agurs Court arrived at
73. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (struggling with an "inevitably
imprecise standard").
74. Id. at 107-08.
75. Id. at 107; see also id. at 110 ("If evidence highly probative of innocence is
in [the prosecutor's] file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he
has actually overlooked it.... [T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of
such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed
76. See id. at 109 ("If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed,
the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow
complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.").
77. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) ("If, when all is
said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had
but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where
the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specified command of Congress.")
(footnote omitted). In federal habeas actions, on the other hand, Kotteakos replaces
Chapman ("harmless beyond a reasonable doubt") as providing the standard for
reversal. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).
78. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 (rejecting the Kotteakos test).
79. See id. (holding that "[u]nless every nondisclosure is regarded as
automatic error, the constitutional standard of materiality must impose a higher
burden [than the harmless error test] on the defendant").
80. See id.
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for defining materiality, the best one can do is draw out the "standard-
sounding" sentences from the opinion: The withheld evidence must be "of
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a
fair trial;"81 it must rise to the level where it "might have affected the
outcome of the trial;' 82 and it must be such that it "created a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist.
'83
The Court in United States v. Bagley84 took another crack at defining
the standard of materiality to be applied in Brady cases. Following the
lead of Agurs, the Bagley Court proclaimed the need for a standard more
lenient than that for reversal based on newly discovered evidence, in which
one must show that the evidence "probably would have resulted in
acquittal," 5 but stricter than the Kotteakos harmless error standard. 6 The
Bagley Court then paraded out the two policy concerns from Agurs: A
more lenient standard for reversal would lead to finding error in every
instance in which the prosecution has failed to provide exculpatory
evidence, and a less lenient definition of materiality would put a prosecutor
in the position of having "to deliver his entire file to defense counsel"
rather than risk committing reversible error.87  Against that policy
backdrop, the Bagley Court provided this standard for materiality:
"[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." 8 At first reading, one could respond that the
Bagley Court could not have meant what it said. Requiring a "reasonable
probability" that the result would have been different seems the same as
the newly discovered evidence standard (probably would have resulted in
acquittal), which is the very standard the Bagley Court deemed too strict.
89
However, for the Bagley Court, the phrase "reasonable probability" was a
term of art: "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." 90
81. Id. at 108.
82. Id. at 104.
83. Id. at 112.
84. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
85. Id. at 680-81.
86. Id. at 681.
87. Id. at 680.
88. Id. at 682. The Bagley Court specifically adopted the formulation of the
Agurs test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the case setting the
standard for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
89. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680-81.
90. Id. at 682.
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Taking the lead from the Bagley Court's definition of reasonable
probability, Kyles v. Whitley,91 the final significant Supreme Court
pronouncement on this issue, makes clear that the standard of material
exculpatory evidence is intended to reflect moral confidence in the verdict
as opposed to mathematical probabilities. 92 "The question is not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. '93 Again,
as in Bagley, the Court refers to the materiality decision as one intersecting
with a moral-like sense of "confidence" in the verdict.94 But how is one to
conceptually link withheld evidence with moral comfort or discomfort?
For the Kyles Court, a defendant establishes materiality "by showing that
the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." 9
B. Why the Supreme Court Standards for Materiality, When Applied
Outside the Competing Narrative Context of "The Story That Was" and
"The Story That Should Have Been, " Fail to Provide Meaningful Guidance
in Brady Cases
Offering only two-dimensional concepts within the texts of Agurs,
Bagley, and Kyles, the current standards for designating exculpatory
evidence as material are static phrases, incapable of guiding appellate
courts in the required moral and analytic exploration of whether one can
have "confidence in the verdict." 96  Collectively and individually, the
91. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
92. Id. at 434-35. The Court held that "it is not a sufficiency of evidence test..
The possibility of an acquittal ... does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to
convict." Id.
93. Id. at 434.
94. See id. ("A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly
shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial."') (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
95. Id. at 435.
96. See id. (noting that it is essential to look at whether excluded evidence
"could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine the confidence in the verdict" when determining if it is material); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 ("Consistent with 'our overriding concern with the
justice of the finding of guilt,' a constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be
reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.") (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 ("The proper
standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the
finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing
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existing standards for Brady error appear to ask the judge to: (1) look at
the withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) look at the trial transcript; (3) ask
himself questions like: "Was this a fair trial?" "Am I morally comfortable
with the verdict?" "Was this withheld evidence a big deal (i.e., significant
in this case)?"; (4) and, finally, after looking at the transcript and the Brady
evidence, look into his soul and answer "Yes" or "No."
The problem is that the questions posed by the standards are totally
unmoored to any meaningful context. In most appellate situations, the
bench is evaluating the impact of some alleged error on "the case that
was." In the world of Brady, however, one is assessing "the case that never
was" (but could have been if the defense had been provided with the
exculpatory evidence). 97
Interestingly, one can readily discern a narrative theme if one looks at
the standards from Agurs, Bagley, and Kyles as providing practical
metaphors for expressing when withholding exculpatory evidence denies
the defendant a fair trial, rather than as offering clear analytical guidance.
Take Agurs's concept of raising "a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist"98 and Bagley's "'a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome."' 99 Where else but in the story, which could have been told
by the exculpatory evidence, would one find a "reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist,"'1 or locate the basis for "undermin[ing] confidence in
the outcome[?]' ' 0 1 Kyles brings the image of narrative almost to the
surface when the Court speaks of "put[ting] the whole case in such a
different light." 1°2 For what do we mean when we say that we now see a
person or experience in a different light other than that, with subsequent
additional information, we would have changed our story about the person
or experience? Narrative theory, pitting the case that was against the case
that never was, was always implicit in Brady.
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (footnote omitted).
97. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that error occurs
"where the [suppressed] evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").
98. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
99. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
100. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
101. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 694).
102. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
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VI. INCORPORATING NARRATIVE THEORY INTO EVALUATION OF
BRADY ERROR
When I propose incorporating narrative theory into the Brady
analysis, I am not suggesting discarding the Agurs, Bagley, or Kyles
standards. Rather, I am proposing using a relevant and powerful analytic
tool to apply those standards in the context of prosecutorial action or
inaction resulting in a diminished defense narrative at trial.
Here is how I propose that the Court proceed using the tool of
narrative theory. An appellate court would envision the best closing
argument the defense could have given (regardless of the actual closing)
10 3
with the information available at the trial. I choose the closing argument
because it is the point where advocates attempt to weave the evidence
presented at trial into a persuasive narrative they wish the jury to adopt.)
4
As such, the defense's closing is a good proxy for the narrative framework
the defense hopes jurors will utilize in assessing the evidence at trial.
0 5
Trial attorneys intuitively appreciate narrative theory, for in their world, all
that exists is information, a lack of information, inferences, and the
narratives and stories drawn from those inferences. 0 6 Within this world, it
simply makes sense to evaluate the impact of withheld information by
assessing the additional and/or alternative stories which could have been
told in closing argument with the withheld information.
The appellate court would then look at the closing argument the
defense could have delivered had it received the exculpatory evidence from
103. If the analysis I propose is followed, the government on appeal is certain
to provide the court with both the strongest defense closing which could have been
made at the trial that was, and its counterarguments to the defense closing from the
trial that never was.
104. See BETrYRUTH WALTER, THE JURY SUMMATION AS SPEECH GENRE:
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF WHAT IT MEANS TO THOSE WHO USE IT 40-41, 86-91,
101-05 (1988), for an extensive sociological analysis of the role of the closing argument
in persuasively establishing the stories of the parties.
105. See generally MARILYN BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING,
ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 469 (1989) (describing closing arguments as "your
opportunity, once all the evidence has been presented, to argue how the jurors can
reach the verdict you desire").
106. See John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What
Is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV.
85, 107 (1999) ("All that exists in a courtroom is information, lack of information, and
the inferences from that information and its lack; these inferences in turn create the
narratives and subnarratives which eventually compose the case theory.") (footnote
omitted).
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the prosecution. The court would then compare the two closings -that of
the trial that was, and that of the trial that never was. In doing so, I would
suggest that courts ask two questions, the answers to which would give
strong guidance for the application of the Agurs, Bagley, and Kyles
standards:
(1) Could the defendant have told a plausible, different story
with the withheld evidence than the story he told at trial?
Being denied the ability to raise what is in effect a different
defense would seem to put one well on the way to triggering
the standards of Agurs, Bagley, and Kyles. Of course, some
consideration of possible prosecution counterarguments
based on the evidence is proper in the court's decision, but
again, the point is "plausibility," not whether the court would
personally find the prosecution's hypothetical
counterarguments convincing.
(2) With the exculpatory evidence, could the defendant have
made the same story "significantly more persuasive?" An
affirmative answer to the second inquiry should likewise put
the defendant on the path to reversal.
I recognize that with terms like "plausible" and "significantly more
persuasive," appellate courts have a broad, subjectively circumscribed field
within which to maneuver. But my object is not so much to constrain
appellate judges as to provide them with appropriate tools to look at the
right information and ask the right questions. When employing narrative
theory to a Brady decision, courts will have two vivid, concrete narrative
visions to compare (closing arguments from the trial that was, and the trial
that never was) and will therefore be able to meaningfully apply the
standards of Agurs, Bagley, and Kyles within a context that reflects how
cases are really tried and how jurors really decide.
VII. A CASE EXAMPLE: A TALE OF Two TALES107
B was charged with the armed robbery of a Payless ShoeSource store
107. For over two years, I have been working on this case under the aegis of
the Seattle University School of Law Access to Justice Institute with co-counsel,
Professor Jacquiline McMurtrie of The University of Washington Innocence Clinic.
Because this case is currently moving through the court system, I thought it best to try
to limit identifying information. I have also simplified the case a bit, choosing not to
discuss all Brady material withheld in the case, but I do not feel that in doing so I have
distorted the case (at least not in favor of the defendant).
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on April 1, 1999. In his first trial, defendant B acted pro se. The
government did not present any forensic or physical evidence. Instead, the
prosecution's entire case centered on the testimony of the robbery victim,
the sole employee present at the store, Ms. SB. 10 8
Ms. SB described the robber to the police that evening as being
Hispanic, in his early twenties, about 150 pounds, five feet eight inches tall,
and wearing baggy light green jeans and a baggy gray sweatshirt. Ms. SB
described the remainder of the robber's face as covered in foundation
makeup, with a large blue circle outlined in white on one side of his face
and a red mark on the opposite temple. Ms. SB also reported seeing
makeup or paint on the man's hands in the form of roughly five small red
dashes. The responding officers relayed to local media that face paint was
"effective in concealing [the robber's] identity." The so-called "Clown
Robbery" became the subject of media headlines.
In subsequent interviews and at trial, Ms. SB recalled seeing the
robber enter the store wearing a handkerchief over the lower half of his
face and a baseball cap with the brim forward. The robber remained at her
back and spoke over her shoulder while demanding money from the till.
Ms. SB relayed that she saw the robber's profile best.
At the time of the incident, defendant B was thirty-nine years old,
five feet nine and one-half inches tall, weighed in the range of 200 pounds,
and his arms, hands, and neck were covered with tattoos.
Six days after the robbery, Detective H, the investigator assigned to
the case, spoke with Ms. SB for the first time. Detective H showed Ms. SB
a color photomontage, comprised of six Hispanic males facing forward.
Detective H included only one photograph in which a man was wearing a
gray sweatshirt-the type of clothing Ms. SB previously described in police
reports as being worn by the robber. After comparing the six pictures, Ms.
SB picked the photograph of the man in a gray sweatshirt in position
number four-defendant B. Detective H next showed her a booking
photograph to confirm her selection. Ms. SB was shown only one profile
shot: that of Mr. B. When asked at trial whether seeing the additional
photograph changed her mind about her selection, Ms. SB said "No, it
made me more certain that was him because the profile is what I looked at
for most of the time when he was taking money."
After showing Ms. SB the booking photograph of Mr. B, Detective H
108. Every factual statement about the case is supported in either testimony
recorded in trial transcripts or in government documents.
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spoke to Ms. SB in a taped interview. Having just seen his picture, Ms. SB
described-as if from memory-Mr. B's facial structure for the very first
time. After Ms. SB's account of the incident, in which she carefully
described studying the young robber's face and features, Detective H
asked, "What about tattoos?," to which Ms. SB questioned, "Tattoos?"
Detective H asked again whether Ms. SB had noticed any tattoos on the
night of the robbery, and Ms. SB answered in the negative.
Based on this testimony alone (defendant B did not testify), the jury
hung 9-3 for acquittal. The court declared a mistrial, and the prosecution
subsequently chose to retry B.
Defendant B was represented by counsel at his second trial for the
Payless robbery. Again, the prosecution presented neither forensic nor
physical evidence. Again, the jury heard the eyewitness testimony of Ms.
SB. There was, in fact, only one substantive addition to the prosecution's
case-The testimony of jailhouse informant A. Informant A testified that
in early April, defendant B confessed to committing the Payless robbery to
him. The jury knew A had a juvenile conviction for drugs six years earlier
and that he was receiving a deal for his testimony. A's deal included the
dismissal of a drug possession charge and the reduction of a felony burglary
charge to a misdemeanor. The jury also knew informant A was a current
drug user, had a personal grudge against defendant B, and, in the past, had
given a close relative's name to police instead of his own, knowing that this
attempt to protect himself was likely to lead to the arrest of an innocent
family member when A failed to appear in court. In other words, the jury
knew that informant A was scum.
The prosecution's story of how it came to use informant A in the
second trial was one of chance, fate, and happenstance in which the
testimony fell into the prosecution's proverbial lap. According to this
story, on June 17, 1999, while in jail, A told Deputy DC that he had
information about the Clown Robbery (which was then nearing the
conclusion of the first trial) and that he would trade his information for
some consideration by the government. By the time Detective H, the
primary investigating officer in both trials, went to the jail, however, A had
been released and could not be located. Then, on July 15, 1999, A was
arrested for drug possession during the execution of a search warrant by
the City-County Narcotics Unit (CCNU). Detective H, who had
accompanied the CCNU, then talked to A and began the process that
would culminate in informant A testifying against defendant B in return for
a deal.
Even at the time of the second trial, there were some very strange
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aspects of this story. Detective H had provided some of the information
cited in the affidavit that justified the July 15, 1999 residential search
during which A was arrested. Yet neither his information, nor any
information in the affidavit, mentioned or referred to A in any way. In
other words, ostensibly this search had nothing to do with A. Detective H
then accompanied the CCNU on the search where he just happened to find
informant A on the premises. But H was not a member of the CCNU; he
was a robbery detective. Why was he on the search? Again, strange-but
there was not a great deal to be made of it.
Given all the above information, one can imagine the defense's
closing argument: After discussing the significance of the fact that there is
absolutely no forensic or physical evidentiary corroboration for the live
witness's testimony, and then systematically attacking the eyewitness who
had literally described a different man than defendant B by failing to
mention any tattoos and who ultimately had selected the defendant from a
suggestive photo display, defense counsel would focus upon informant A-
So what do we have so far? Not a shred of forensic evidence-no
fingerprints, fibers, or traces of face paint on clothing. No physical
evidence-no gun, no money, and no face paint; nothing but an eyewitness
who is as untrustworthy as imaginable. Based on that evidence, it is more
likely than not that defendant B is innocent. Of course, that is not defendant
B's burden. The State must prove him guilty, and must do so beyond a
reasonable doubt. So let us look at informant A. Let us look closely
because, unless a jury believes him beyond a reasonable doubt, there is really
nothing else left in the case to carry that very heavy burden-no matter how
it is added up and mixed together.
Before we look at informant A and his actions in this case, let us first
look at the character of his breed. I want us to think about the moral code of
the jailhouse informant. First, I want to be careful about being too self-
righteous. After all, if I were facing prison, facing years in a cage and in fear
of being beaten or raped by a larger fellow inmate or being the target of an
ethnic prison gang who wants to kill me solely because someone of their race
was killed by someone of my race, am I so sure that I wouldn't lie to save
myself? I would not lie and get my mother or wife in trouble to save myself
(at least I don't think so), but would I really worry about some guy I didn't
even like? Would you-really? And that is you and me. We are not people
who spend our lives in and out of jail, routinely trading others to get out of
responsibility for what we do. So, if we cannot even be certain how we
would behave if faced with the choice of lying or going to prison, can we
really believe that a jailhouse informant like A would be in any way bound
by some set of Jimmy Stewart values like "never tell a lie"? How could you
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trust any jailhouse informant-and trust him beyond a reasonable doubt-
when he has nothing to lose and everything to gain by lying? And what did
confessed drug addict A have to lose? What is there to make A tell the truth?
What risk does he take by lying? Perjury? The prosecutor wants to believe
him. In any event, there is no third person who can contradict his claim. We
have only his word that the conversation even took place.
Who is this informant? He is a person who could have learned his
entire story about the robbery through the newspapers or television while
sitting in jail. He is a junkie who just wanted to get out of jail, who just
wanted to get on the streets and feel drugs in his veins again-is there
anything a drug user would not say to get his fix? You know that drug users
would cheat and steal from their friends, their wife, and their parents to get a
fix. They are sick; the drugs are all that matter. In fact, A demonstrated he
would lie to protect himself-even if that lie would likely get innocent family
members into trouble. He is a person who initiated all this by telling Deputy
DC he had information but would only provide it if he got a deal in return.
And what a deal he got: Despite the fact he was caught with a spoon of
narcotics in his hand-possession of narcotics dismissed. Dead-to-rights on
a felony burglary-a felony reduced to a misdemeanor, no jail time, no
probation. The 90-day sentence he was to serve on yet another charge is
commuted, and when the dust settles, A is released as soon as he completes
his trial testimony. To round this off, A personally dislikes defendant B. Is
the prosecutor kidding?
Have you seen any evidence that would not lead you to conclude this
man would do anything- lie, cheat, steal- to keep himself out of jail and get
back to his drugs? Would anyone trust informant A if he asked, "lend me
$5.00, and I'll pay you back tonight?" Of course not. You would not even
consider trusting him. Yet the prosecution would ask this jury to trust him as
the central piece of an extremely serious criminal accusation, not with $5.00,
but with the fate of defendant B-and to trust him beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Ridiculous. Can you truly say you have encountered anyone you
would trust less?
Yet the jury convicted defendant B of robbery in the second degree.
Incredible. Somehow a completely unreliable eyewitness and an equally
unreliable jailhouse informant equaled guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since this was defendant B's "third strike," he was sentenced to lifetime
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
In postconviction investigation, counsel on habeas corpus discovered
a series of government documents making it apparent that the investigating
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police, and possibly even the prosecutor, had a relationship with informant
A near mid-June 1999, over a month prior to the supposedly happenstance
scenario testified to by Detective H and Deputy DC. One might have
thought that, in light of this new information, defendant B would get a new
trial. Yet, applying Agurs, Brady, Bagley, and Kyles, a series of appellate
decisions found that though the withheld evidence may have been
exculpatory, failure to provide it was not prejudicial (i.e., material). To the
appellate courts, the jury had already heard that informant A had a
relationship with the prosecution, that he was a junkie and a liar, and that
he was only testifying because he had been given a favorable deal.
Nonetheless, with all of this in front of them, the jury convicted. So,
reasonably, what difference would this additional information have
made? 109
The additional information, however, could have made a significant
difference if the defense could have used the withheld information about
the state's mid-June relationship with the informant in their closing. In
that event, the defense could have offered the jury a completely different
and completely plausible story than that presented at trial, which not only
attacked informant A as above, but would have also questioned the
legitimacy of the prosecution's entire case.110
This would have been plain to an appellate court reviewing defendant
B's case if they had used narrative theory as their analytic tool rather than
109. Plainly, these appellate courts did not heed the Supreme Court's
admonition that "if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence
of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt."
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113 (1976).
110. In Kyles v. Whitley, the Court noted that materiality must be assessed for
its potential power to dismantle other parts of the prosecution's case, not just an
individual witness. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445-46 (1995) (noting that
withheld evidence of a prosecution witness's statements would have raised
opportunities to attack the probative value of crucial physical evidence, the
circumstances in which it was found, as well as the thoroughness, and even the good
faith of the investigation); see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir.
1986) (noting that "[a] common trial tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber
of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we may consider such
use in assessing a possible Brady violation"); Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1042 (5th
Cir. 1985) (awarding a new trial because withheld evidence "carried within it the
potential ... for the ... discrediting... of the police methods employed in assembling
the case."). The Supreme Court in Kyles reasoned that impeachment evidence could
have been used to "sully the credibility" of investigating officers and raise suspicions
about the prosecution's "remarkably uncritical," attitude toward the investigation.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S at 445,447.
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merely asking whether their "confidence in the verdict""' was undermined,
and then intuiting the answer.112 Specifically, the appellate courts should
have compared the previous closing argument, the core of which would still
have remained, to a closing argument including the following, based on the
withheld evidence:
In some ways all of these reasonable-in fact, I would contend
inevitable-conclusions concerning the absolute unreliability of A are only
the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The mass of that island of ice in this case is
composed of evidence that the state had a relationship with A by mid-June
1999. So let's think about what it means: First, it means you can reasonably
infer that the "tale" about informant A going to the jailor, Detective H just
missing informant A, and then Detective H serendipitously finding
informant A at last during a search totally unconnected to A was just that-a
tale carefully constructed to make the state look less involved, less interested
in trying to get defendant B after his first trial, a trial in which defendant B
represented himself, a trial which resulted in a hung jury.
But you might ask yourself why, if the first trial was not over when they
made this deal, did the state not use A in the first trial? I do not know.
Maybe they thought they did not need him-after all, the prosecutor was a
top prosecutor, whereas defendant B did not even graduate from high
school-or that informant A was too risky a witness, especially to suddenly
bring in at the eleventh hour. Also, I am not saying that the deal was
specifically to testify in defendant B's case; it is possible that it was a general
deal to cooperate as an informant and to be called upon when needed, with
the threat of second degree burglary held over his head. After all, why
should we trust Deputy DC when he tells us informant A approached him on
June 16th offering to testify against defendant B? All that we have to
corroborate the word of each of the state witnesses in this case are the words
of other state witnesses. Given that the most reasonable inference from the
evidence is that the state presented a totally fabricated story about their
relationship with informant A, what is the basis upon which the prosecutor
can ask you to trust what you are being told, and trust it beyond a reasonable
doubt?
What I am saying is that this is not just about whether you believe a
drug addict who would sell out his own family. No, it is much, much more
than that. If, as the evidence indicates, the state made a deal with informant
A in mid-June, but then presented you with this other story, you cannot trust
111. See discussion supra Part V.B.
112. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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anything about their case. If they would deceive you about this, and would
even call witnesses to testify under oath to support this charade, why would
they be above telling a pathetic, strung-out addict like informant A what to
say? In fact, why should you trust that the photo identification procedure
with Ms. SB was not far more suggestive and unfair than even the testimony
shows?
Because you know that these are genuine questions, you also know that
we are way, way past reasonable doubt because you cannot find beyond a
reasonable doubt absent the highest level of trust in the state's case. Given
the strong inference of a mid-June 1999 deal, such trust is impossible.
With this comparative narrative framework now providing the
context for the Brady inquiry as to materiality in defendant B's case," 3 it
should be clear that the withheld information would have both made the
attack on informant A's credibility significantly more persuasive, and
afforded credibility to a plausible new story that was otherwise unavailable
(i.e., that the jury cannot trust the entire prosecution case). As such, it
would be difficult to fathom how, given the comparison of the case that was
with the case that never was, defendant B's case would not be put "in a
different light," thus "undermin[ing] confidence in the verdict"" 4 from his
second trial.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When Justice Souter penned the majority opinion in Old Chief, he
obviously realized he was creating precedent. I doubt, however, that it
ever crossed his mind that perhaps the most important precedential aspect
of the opinion was its adoption of a theory of human cognition and juror
decision making. Yet I believe, ultimately, that will be the legacy of the
opinion.
While I do not purport to know the eventual impact of narrative
theory on the analyses of the appellate courts, the theory plainly has direct
import in the Brady arena. In the world of the trial advocate, where all
that exists is information, lack of information, inferences, and the
narratives which result, the prejudice from failing to provide exculpatory
information to the defense can only be fully appreciated by looking at the
113. See discussion supra Part V.A.
114. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 435 (A defendant establishes materiality
of undisclosed evidence "by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.").
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narrative(s) the defense could not tell at trial because it lacked the
withheld information. Comparing the defense closing argument from the
trial that was (i.e., without the Brady materiality) with that of the trial that
never was (i.e., with the Brady material) is the most meaningful
methodology for appellate courts to fairly assess the prejudice (i.e.,
materiality) resulting from the denial of Brady information.
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